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NOTES
Interpreting State Aid to Religious Schools Under the
Establishment Clause: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause' in cases dealing with public aid to sectarian schools has undergone
significant changes since the Court first dealt with the issue almost fifty
years ago.2 At that time, the Court declared that the Establishment Clause3
was "intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.'
Nevertheless, the Court recently held in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills

School District4 that state funding of a sign-language interpreter provided to
a deaf student attending a Catholic high school did not violate the Establishment Clause.5
This Note traces the development of the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as it relates to public aid to sectarian schools and
examines the basis of the Court's current view as expressed in Zobrest.6
The Note posits that Zobrest repre§ents an unprecedented move by the
Court towards accommodating public aid to religious schools.7 In addition,
the Note suggests that Zobrest may represent a new method of Establishment Clause interpretation in which the Court bases its holdings solely on
factual similarities of previous cases instead of invoking the Lemon test.8
The Note concludes that such an approach is likely to make Establishment
Clause analysis even more unpredictable than it is now.9
James Zobrest has been deaf since birth.' 0 In 1988, his parents enrolled him in a Roman Catholic high school in Tucson, Arizona. Pursuant
to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)" and a corre1. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The Court first addressed the issue in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The Everson
decision, however, also illustrates a tension in Establishment Clause interpretation between the
separation of church and state and the funding of education. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
4. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
5. Id.at 2469.
6. See infra notes 39-138 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 139-74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
10. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2464.
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1401, 1412, 1413, 1414(a), 1415 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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sponding state statute, the Zobrests asked the public school district to provide a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to class .l7 The school

district denied the request because of their conclusion that such aid would
violate the Establishment Clause. 3 The Zobrests then initiated a civil action 4 asserting "that the IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment require[d] [the school district] to provide James with an interpreter [at the Catholic school], and that the Establishment Clause [did] not
bar such relief."' 5
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the

Zobrests' request for a preliminary injunction.

6

The court concluded that

such aid would likely violate the Establishment Clause because the interpreter would be a conduit for James's religious education and would thus
promote "religious development at government expense."' 7 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,'" holding that the

interpreter's function of relating both secular educational lessons and religious teachings would have the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.' 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 20 The Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not prevent the school district from providing an

interpreter because the aid was "part of a general government program that
distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under
12. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The state statute was Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761,
15-764 to 15-769 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring special educational provisions for exceptional
children). James attended a school for the deaf during grades one through five, and a public
school with a publicly funded sign-language interpreter during grades six through eight. His parents enrolled him in Salpointe Catholic High School at the beginning of his ninth grade year.
Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
13. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The school district first referred the matter to the county
attorney and the Arizona Attorney General, both of whom concluded that providing an interpreter
on the Catholic school's premises would violate the United States Constitution. Id.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(A) (1988) grants jurisdiction to the federal courts for claims
brought under IDEA. It provides: "The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
of actions brought under this subsection without regard to the amount in controversy." Id.
15. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at A-35).
18. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
19. Id. at 1194-95. The court found that the aid violated the three-part test for interpreting
the Establishment Clause announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon
test requires state aid to (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement in
religion. Id. at 612-13; see also infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. The court of appeals
held that the interpreter's function would violate the second prong of the test. The court also
indicated that even if the interpreter's services were provided only for secular subjects, the monitoring required would violate the entanglement prong of the test. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196 n.5.
20. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465.
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the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends."'2 1 The Court held
that because the aid program entitled individual parents to choose where to
send their children to school but did not create a financial incentive for
parents to send their children to a religious school, the presence of the
sign-language interpreter in the Catholic school could not "be attributed to
state decisionmaking." 22 The Court also held that, at most, the Catholic
school would receive only an indirect benefit from the aid, "assuming that
the school makes a profit on each student; [and] that, without an IDEA
interpreter, the child would have gone to school elsewhere and . . the
school... would have been unable to fill that child's spot."'2 3
The Court disagreed with the school district's argument that providing
the sign-language interpreter was similar to forms of aid that the Court
found unconstitutional in Meek v. Pittenger, and Grand Rapids School
Districtv. Ball.' In Meek, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania program
that provided publicly funded services including counseling, psychological
services, speech and hearing therapy, and instructional materials and equipment, including tape recorders, to nonpublic schools because it was not certain that the aid would be used exclusively for secular purposes.2 6 Similarly
in Ball, the Court struck down two programs that provided public employees to teach students in religious classrooms because it found a substantial
risk that the aid would result in the advancement of religion at government
expense.2 7 The Zobrest Court concluded that the aid in those cases "relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their students," whereas the aid in Zobrest was not an expense the
school "otherwise would have assumed."2 8 The Court also noted that
"[hiandicapped children, not sectarian schools, are the primary beneficiaries of the [program]." 29 Finally, the Court distinguished the aid by asserting that the task of a sign-language interpreter is
quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor ....
Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language interpreter
would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is
presented to the class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to "transmit everything that is said in exactly
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.at 2467.
Id.
id.
at 2468.
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Meek, 421 U.S. at 365-66; see also infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
Ball, 473 U.S. at 396-97; see also infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
Zobrest, 113 S. Ct at 2468-69.
Id.at 2469.
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the same way it was intended."... The sign-language interpreter
they have requested will neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and hence the provision30 of such assistance is not
baried by the Establishment Clause.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor,
dissented from the opinion on the grounds that the Court did not have to

reach the constitutional question.3 1 Justice Blackmun, again joined by Justice Souter, further dissented from the Court's resolution of the Establishment Clause issue.32 Justice Blackmun contended that secular and religious
components were "inextricably intertwined" in this case because the interpreter "would be required to communicate the material covered in religion
class . . .and the daily Masses at which [the school] encourages attendance."23 3 Justice Blackmun argued that even a general aid program "may
have specific applications that are constitutionally forbidden under the Establishment Clause." 4 He also contended that such an aid program could
be unconstitutional even if it took the form of direct aid to students or their
parents.3 5 Although secular and nonideological public aid to sectarian
schools had been upheld in the past, Justice Blackmun declared that "[the
Court] has always proscribed the provision of benefits that afford even 'the
opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views."' 3 6 In this case,

though, the government was "fumish[ing] the medium for communication
of a religious message. '37 As a result, Justice Blackmun asserted that the
state's providing a sign-language interpreter clearly violated the Establish38
ment Clause.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2469-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justices dissented on grounds that the
Court could have remanded the case for consideration of statutory and regulatory issues. Id.at
dissenting). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded
2469-70 (Blacknun, J.,
that because only the First Amendment issues were litigated below, the Court could address the
constitutional claim. Id. at 2465-66. This point, though worthy of further discussion, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
32. Id.at 2469, 2471-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2472 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
34. Ia at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)
and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985)). In Bowen, the Court held that a general aid
program did not on its face violate the Establishment Clause, but the Court remanded the case for
examination of the constitutionality of particular applications. 487 U.S. at 621-22. In Aguilar,the
Court struck down a publicly funded remedial education program for educationally disadvantaged
children; the Court found that the aid would require excessive government entanglement to ensure
that religion was not advanced. 473 U.S. at 413-14; see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
35. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 395 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)).
36. Ma(Blacknun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244).
dissenting).
37. Id.at 2474 (Blackmun, J.,
38. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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As Zobrestdemonstrates, the Court has struggled to define the parameters of the Establishment Clause in cases involving public aid to sectarian
schools. 39 The Court first addressed this issue in Everson v. Board of Education."° In Everson, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute that authorized local school districts to pay for the transportation of children attending parochial schools.4 1 In defining the limits of acceptable aid, the Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions."'4 2 In five to
four decision, however, the Court upheld the statute.4 3 The Court stated
that although the Establishment Clause forbids the government from advancing religion, it must not "hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their
own religion."' Because the state contributed no money to the parochial
school, and because the program was similar to other permissible public
services-such as police and fire protection, public roads, and sidewalksthat are "indisputably marked off from the [school's] religious function,""
the Court found the statute to be "a general program to help parents get
their children... safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools,"
rather than an aid to religion.4 6 Thus, Everson illustrates the tension between the Establishment Clause requirement of separation of church and
state and the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion.
Because the separation of church and state is not absolute, the problem becomes one of degree.4 7
39. See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools-An Update, 75 CAL.L. Rnv. 5, 6-13 (1987) (reviewing the Court's distinctions of permissible state aid to parochial schools under the Establishment Clause).

40. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. Id at 17. The case involved a local school district that, pursuant to the statute, authorized
reimbursements to parents for money spent to transport their children to school. Part of the money
was used to reimburse parents whose children attended a Catholic parochial school. d at 3.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id at 18.
44. Id. at 16. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
45. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
46. Id at 18.
47. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a New York law that permitted public schools to release students during school hours to go to religious centers for religious instruction). The Court stated:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy
that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the "free
exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of religion are concerned, the separation
must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however,
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
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The decision of the Court in Board of Education v. Allen4" further
demonstrates this tension in resolving the degree of separation that the Establishment Clause requires. In Allen, the Court upheld a New York law
that required public school authorities to provide textbooks to all students,
including those in private sectarian schools.4 9 The Court again recognized
"that the line between state neutrality to religion and state support of religion is not easy to locate."5 0 Nevertheless, as in Everson,5 the Court upheld the program by characterizing it as a general program available to all
students.5" Because the statute authorized only secular textbooks, the Court
held that the aid was intended only to further secular education. 53 The
Court refused to find that the sectarian schools would use the secular textbooks to further their religious purpose.54 Thus, the sectarian schools' performance of a secular educational function in addition to their religious
function was sufficient to convince the Court that the aid did not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.5 5
Three years later in the seminal decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 6 the
Court announced the need for established criteria in its analysis of the Establishment Clause. The Court stated its intention to "draw lines with refer... The problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.
Id. at 312-14; see also Kenneth F. Mott, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause:
From Separationto Accommodation andBeyond, 14 J.L. & EDuC. 111, 112-45 (1985) (tracing the
evolution of the Court's separationist and accommodationist positions in its interpretation of the
Establishment Clause).
48. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
49. Id. at 248. The New York law required local school boards, without charge, to "purchase
and to loan upon individual request, to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in
grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compulsory education law, textbooks." Id. at 239 n.3 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1967)).
50. IL at 242.
51. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see also supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
52. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
53. Id. at 244-45.
54. Id. at 248.
55. md.at 243-49.
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court struck down Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes that provided "state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools." Id. at 606,
The Rhode Island statute provided a salary supplement for teachers of secular subjects in religious
schools where the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education was below that of the average in the public schools. Id. at 607. The Pennsylvania statute authorized the state to reimburse
religious schools for expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
secular subjects. Id. at 609-10. The Court held that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause
because they impermissibly resulted in "excessive entanglement between government and religion." Id. at 613; see also infra note 59 and accompanying text. The Court found there was great
potential for the entangling of religious and secular instruction and that the surveillance necessary
to ensure that such entangling did not take place would itself result in impermissible entanglement. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-22. The Court also found that such subsidization would impermissibly lead to "political division along religious lines[,] ... one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id. at 622 (citation omitted).
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ence to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 57 Accordingly, the
Court presented a three-part test for this analysis: "[F]irst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; 58 second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute

must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'

59

Application of the Lemon test resulted in a more separationist approach to public aid to religious schools. For example, in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,60 the Court struck down
three New York aid programs with the secular legislative purpose of "pre-

serving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of [New York's]
school children," and "promoting pluralism and diversity among its public
and nonpublic schools." 1 These programs failed under the Lemon test because they impermissibly advanced the religious mission of the sectarian
schools. 2 They included direct money grants to the schools for maintenance and repair, a tuition reimbursement program for parents of children
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
58. State programs have consistently survived the secular legislative purpose prong of the
Lemon test because of the Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the
face of the statute." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983); see also infra notes 61, 70,
76, 91, 108, and 128 and accompanying text. Some commentators have even called for the elimination of the purpose prong. See, e.g., William B. Peterson, "APictureHeld Us Captive": Conceptual Confusion and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1827, 1830-49 (1989) (arguing that a
statute's purpose cannot be discovered, and even if it could, it would not be helpful to the Court in
deciding Establishment Clause cases).
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (citations omitted)). Justice
White dissented in Lemon, arguing that the decision
creat[ed] an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools. The State cannot
finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but
if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught-a promise the school and its teachers are quite willing and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is then entangled
in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 668 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice White has argued against a
strict separationist interpretation of the religion clauses in regard to public aid to religious schools,
contending that the denial of such aid would make it "more difficult, if not impossible, for parents
to follow the dictates of their conscience and seek a religious as well as secular education for their
children." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (White,
J., dissenting); see also John J. Coughlin, Common Sense in Formationfor the Common GoodJustice White's Dissents in the ParochialSchool Aid Cases: Patronof Lost Causes or Precursor
of Good News, 66 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 261,265 (1992) (noting that Justice White "has persistently
dissented from the Supreme Court's strict-separationist, no-aid position").
60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id. at 774-94.
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attending nonpublic schools, and a tax relief program for parents who failed
63
to qualify for the tuition reimbursement program.

The Nyquist Court expressed concern that the lack of "appropriate restrictions" on the aid might result in impermissible use of the aid for religious purposes.' 4 The Court was also unpersuaded that the method of
aid--direct reimbursement to parents as opposed to schools-negated the
program's primary effect of advancing religion.6' The Court's recognition

that religious schools performed a secular educational function in addition
to their religious purposes was no longer sufficient to justify state aid, thus
denoting a shift from Everson and Allen. 66 The Court required more adequate assurances that the aid would "be used exclusively for secular, neutral
and nonideological purposes."'6 7
In Meek v. Pittenger,61 however, the Court approved a state program
that lent secular textbooks directly to students in nonpublic schools, including religious schools. 69 Relying on Allen, the Court upheld the program
because it found no evidence that the books would "be used for anything
other than purely secular purposes. ' 0
In contrast to the provision regarding textbooks, the Court held that a
provision for lending instructional material and equipment, including tape
recorders, to the religious schools was unconstitutional. 7 1 Although these
materials were considered "secular, nonideological and neutral," the Court

distinguished them because "it would simply ignore reality to attempt to
separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role
performed" by the schools. 72 However, the Court had made precisely this
63. Id. at 762-65.
64. Id. at 774. The Court wanted assurances that the aid would be used exclusively for
secular purposes. However, given the religious orientation of the schools, the Court did not think
the imposition of such restrictions was possible. Id. at 777-80.
65. Id. at 785-87. The Court stated, "if the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into
the sectarian institutions." Id. at 786.
66. Id. at 775. Because the second prong was violated, the Court did not have to decide
whether the programs violated the entanglement prong. The Court indicated, however, that
"assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense
of continuing political strife over aid to religion." Id. at 794.
67. Id. at 780.
68. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
69. Id. at 361-62.
70. Id. at 362. In fact, the Court found the program "constitutionally indistinguishable from
the New York textbook loan program upheld in [Allen]." Id. at 359.
71. Id. at 355, 362-63. The instructional materials included periodicals, photographs, maps,
charts, recordings, and films. The instructional equipment also included projectors and laboratory
supplies. Id. at 355.
72. Id. at 365.
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differentiation in regard to the textbooks. 73 Nevertheless, the Court held
these materials impermissible because the aid was direct, and the materials
were not capable of restriction to secular purposes.7 4
The Meek Court also struck down a similar provision that provided
"auxiliary services" in the nonpublic schools, including "counseling, testing, and psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and
related services for exceptional children, for remedial students, and for the
educationally disadvantaged." 75 Applying the Lemon test, the Court found
that this aid had a secular legislative purpose as required under the first
prong of the test.76 Further, the Court recognized that the publicly funded
employees providing the auxiliary services were less likely than religious
school teachers to intertwine religious and secular education because they
were "not directly subject to the discipline of a religious authority."77
Nevertheless, because most of the schools that benefitted were religious, the Meek Court found that the services were provided in "an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief." 8 Hence, the Court
declared that "a diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not sufficient: 'The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsi79 Because this certainty could
dized teachers do not inculcate religion.' ,,
not occur without a surveillance scheme that amounted to impermissible
entanglement, the Court held the program unconstitutional under the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.80
The inconsistencies apparent in Meek also surfaced in Wolman v. Wal8
ter. In Wolman, the Court again approved the direct loan of textbooks to
students, but prohibited the loan of other instructional materials and equipment.8 2 In drafting the challenged statutes, the Ohio legislature had attempted to avoid the direct aid pitfalls associated with the instructional
materials in Meek by characterizing the aid as a loan to the pupil or his
parent rather than a loan to the religious school.83 The Court found, however, that "[t]he equipment is substantially the same; it will receive the
same use by the students; and it may still be stored and distributed on the
73.
74.
75.
76.
opment
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Meek, 421 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 367-68. The Court noted the secular legislative purpose of assuring the "full develof the intellectual capacities of the children of Pennsylvania." Id.
Id at 371-72.
d at 371.
Id (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
l at 372.
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Id at 237-38, 249-51.
d at 250.
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nonpublic school premises."84 As a result, the Court held that it "would
exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to justify a result
different from that in Meek."8 5
The Court's contemporary view regarding the Establishment Clause
began to emerge in Mueller v. Allen. 6 In Mueller, the Court again applied
the Lemon test to uphold a Minnesota statute that permitted parents to deduct "expenses incurred for the 'tuition, textbooks and transportation' of
dependents attending elementary or secondary schools."8 7 The statute was

similar to the reimbursement and tax relief programs struck down in Ny-

quist.8 8 However, relying on Allen 9 and Everson,9° the Mueller Court upheld the statute because it had the secular legislative purpose of ensuring
that the state's citizenry was well educated.9" The Court also held that the
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion because it was
part of a broad program "available for educational expenses incurred by all
parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those
whose children attend ... sectarian private schools."92 The Court distinguished its decision from Nyquist on this basis.9 3

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Mueller, conceded that
the effect of state aid provided to parents in this situation was comparable to
direct aid to the schools their children attended.94 Nevertheless, Justice
Rehnquist contended this was not direct aid, but rather an "attenuated finan-

cial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available
84. Id.
85. Id. The Wolman Court upheld provisions for diagnostic and therapeutic services, however. The Court found the diagnostic services permissible because the diagnosticians had limited
contact with the students and provided little or no educational content in their services. The Court
upheld the therapeutic services because they were offered at sites away from the religious schools.
Id. at 244, 247-48.
86. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
87. Id at 391 (quoting MwN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)).
88. 413 U.S. 756, 762-67 (1973); see also supranote 63 and accompanying text. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Mueller, both cases appeared to involve programs for the
relief of financial burdens on religious school parents to the ultimate benefit of religious schools.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 407-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
90. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
91. Mueller,463 U.S. at 394-95. The Court also noted that there "is a strong public interest
in assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian." Id.
at 395.
92. Id. at 397-98.
93. Id. at 398-99. For a discussion of Nyquist, see supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
Cf Ronald D. Rotunda, The ConstitutionalFuture of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. Rnv. 917, 933 (1987)
(arguing that the decision in Mueller is perverse in light of Nyquist "because deductions benefit
the rich more than the poor, while tax credits... do not share that bias").
94. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
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tax benefit at issue."95 The statute thus apparently avoided the "form over
substance" problem of Wolman.f6
The Court further held that the statute was not an incentive for parents
to send their children to religious schools, even though parents who sent
their children to schools that charged tuition received the greatest benefit
under the program. 97 Justice Rehnquist declared that "[the Court] would
be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral
law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private
citizens claimed benefits under the law.""8 Justice Rehnquist did point out,
however, that public school parents also benefitted from deductions under
the statute, and that private schools benefitted public schools by substantially relieving the tax burden associated with their operation. 99
The Court also determined that the statute did not involve excessive
entanglement of government and religion because the "only plausible
source" of this entanglement would be the state's determination of
"whether particular textbooks qualify for a deduction."' 10 0 The Court held
that this was the same determination allowed in Allen."° '
Although Mueller appeared to signal a more relaxed application of the
Lemon test, the Court again returned to a strict separationist approach in the
companion cases of GrandRapids School Districtv. Ball'0 2 and Aguilar v.
Felton.'03 In Ball, the Supreme Court found that two publicly funded programs that provided classes to nonpublic school students in predominantly
sectarian nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause." ° One of
the programs, "Shared Time," involved publicly funded teachers moving
from classroom to classroom in nonpublic schools during the course of the
regular school day, teaching courses that were supplementary to Michigan's
accredited school program.10 5 The second program, "Community Education," offered classes in a variety of subjects at the end of the school day in
95. Id. at 399-400.
96. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
97. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 401.
99. Id. at 402-03.
100. Id. at 403. The Court indicated that because only secular textbooks would qualify for a
deduction, state officials had to determine whether particular books were or were not secular. Id.
101. Id.
102. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
103. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
104. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. The Court noted that "[florty of the forty-one schools at which
the programs operate[d] [were] sectarian in character." Id. at 379.
105. Id. at 375-76. The public school district supplied materials used in the program. Approximately 10% of the publicly funded teachers involved in the program had taught previously in
the same nonpublic schools where they were employed. Id. at 376.
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religious schools, as well as at other sites. 106 The teachers in the commu-

nity education program were part-time public school employees. 107
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, agreed with the lower court's
determination that the first prong of the Lemon test was satisfied because
the purpose of the programs was "manifestly secular."' 08 However, Justice

Brennan found the programs unconstitutional under the primary effect
prong because they "pose[d] a substantial risk of state-sponsored indoctrination."'1 9 The Court concluded that the programs impermissibly promoted
religion in three ways:
The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian

nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at

public expense. The symbolic union of church and state inherent
in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and to the general public. Finally, the

programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their respon-

sibility for teaching secular subjects. 110

Thus, the Court held that the aid was impermissible because it amounted to
a direct subsidy to the religious school."'

In Aguilar v. Felton,"2 a five-member majority of the Court struck
down a New York program that provided for publicly funded employees to

conduct remedial programs" 3 in private religious schools to help with the4
needs of educationally deprived children from low-income families."

Most of the students in the program were enrolled in public schools."' The
106. Id. at 376-77. The classes included "Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess,
Model Building, and Nature Appreciation." Id.
107. Id. at 377.
108. Id. at 383 (quoting the district court's opinion, Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 546 F.
Supp. 1071, 1085 (W.D. Mich. 1982), aftd, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 473 U.S. 373
(1985)).
109. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 397. Because it concluded that the programs violated the primary effect prong, the
Court did not determine whether the programs also violated the entanglement prong. Id. at 397
n.14.
111. Id. at 396.
112. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
113. The programs included "remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English
as a second language, and guidance services." Id. at 406. The publicly funded employees included
"teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers" who had volunteered to teach in the religious schools. Id.
114. Id. at 404-07.
115. Id. at 406. The Court noted that of those students eligible for the program, 13.2% were
enrolled in private schools, and of that group, 84% were enrolled in sectarian schools. Id.
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city of New York was careful to adopt a monitoring system to ensure that
religion would not be promoted in the secular classes." 6 However, the
Court ruled that the monitoring system itself resulted in a violation of the
Establishment Clause because it amounted to "excessive entanglement of
church and state.""' 7 Thus, as one commentator has stated: "Ball failed for
lack of monitoring; Aguilar failed for too much monitoring. In both cases,
the Court assumed ill effects without requiring evidence to support
them."'1 8
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part in Ball,"9
and dissented in Aguilar ° Applying what came to be known as the endorsement test, 12 Justice O'Connor contended that "[i]f a statute lacks a
purpose or effect of advancing religion, [it should not be] invalidate[d]
merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and
state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance
religion."' 2
Perhaps in response to the dilemma created by the outcomes in Ball
and Anguilar,a unanimous Court held in Witters v. Washington Department
of Servicesfor the Blind" 3 that the primary effect of public funds provided
to a blind student attending a private Christian college was not the advancement of religion.' 2 Applying the Lemon test, the Washington Supreme
Court had denied the student's request for assistance for vocational rehabilitation services because the aid "'clearly ha[d] the primary effect of advancing religion'"'-the funds would be used to help the student pursue
26
religious studies at a Christian college.'
116. L. at 409.
117. Id. The Court held that "the scope and duration of [the program] would require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid. This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause
values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement." lId at 412-13.
118. Patricia M. Lines, The EntanglementProng of the Establishment Clause and the Needy
Child in the PrivateSchool: Is DistributiveJustice Possible?, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 16 (1988).
119. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Aguilar,473 U.S. at 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
122. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
123. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
124. Id. at 489. Larry Witters, who suffered from a progressive eye condition, had applied for
vocational rehabilitation aid under a Washington law that "'[provide[d] for special education
and/or training in the professions, business or trades' so as to 'assist visually handicapped persons
to overcome vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and
self-care."' Id. at 483 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 74.16.18 (1981)).
125. lId at 485 (quoting Witters v. Washington Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53,56 (Wash.
1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. (1986)).
126. Id.
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The Supreme Court, also applying the three-part Lemon test, reversed.127 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found a secular purpose
for the aid. 28 He further found that the aid did not have the primary effect
of advancing religion because the aid was paid directly to the student, who
then made a "genuinely independent and private choic[e] of aid recipients."12' 9 Thus, the program was "inno way skewed towards religion" and
"create[d] no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian
education." 130
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, noted the absence of Mueller v. Allen"' from the Court's opinion. Justice Powell emphasized that Mueller strongly supported the Court's
decision because it made clear that "state programs that are wholly neutral
in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to
religion do not violate the second part of the [Lemon] test, because any aid
to religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries." 132
Under the Lemon test, the Court has continued to shift between separationist and accommodationist approaches when dealing with public aid to
religious schools. Perhaps as a result of these varying outcomes, the Court
has expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional Lemon test.1 33 Accordingly, the Court has increasingly looked to alternative methods of interpretation in its Establishment Clause analysis. The method of interpretation
that has moved to the fore is the endorsement test, first espoused by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.1 34 The endorsement test is a modification
of the first two prongs of the traditional Lemon test. Instead of focusing on
the secular purpose and primary effect of state aid, the endorsement test
127. Id.
128. Id. at 485-86. The Court noted that the "program was designed to promote the
well-being of the visually handicapped through the provision of vocation rehabilitation services."
Id.
129. Id. at 487.
130. Id. at 488. Notably, Justice Marshall also observed that "nothing in the record indicate[d] that, if petitioner succeed[ed], any significant portion of the aid expended under the
Washington program as a whole [would] end up flowing to religious education" because no
other person had ever sought to finance religious education under the program. Id. As a result,
the Court did not find it "appropriate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the [Christian college]
as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion." Id. The Court declined to
address the entanglement issue, indicating that it would be inappropriate to do so without the
benefit of a lower court decision on that issue. Id. at 489 n.5.
131. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
132. Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (emphasizing the Court's "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
134. Ld.
at 690-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch the Court upheld a city's inclusion of
a nativity scene in its Christmas display. Id. at 687.

1994]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

1053

focuses on whether the "government intends to convey" or has "the effect
135
of communicating a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."'
The endorsement test gained increased support in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU.' 36 In Allegheny, the Court held that a creche displayed in a
county courthouse was impermissible under the Establishment Clause because it sent a message of governmental endorsement of religion.1 37 The
influence of the endorsement test is evident in Zobrest from the Court's
concern with whether public aid in religious schools can "be attributed to
state decisionmaking."' 138
In light of this background, Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District signifies a strong move by the Court to accommodate public aid to
religious schools. Zobrest may also represent a new method of Establishment Clause interpretation in which the Court bases its holding solely on
factual similarities of previous cases instead of invoking the Lemon test.
A comparison of the facts in Zobrest with those in earlier cases evidences the Court's shift in Establishment Clause interpretation. The aid
39
approved in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind1
demonstrates that the aid in Zobrest would not have presented an Establishment Clause problem if state funds had been given directly to James
Zobrest's parents to hire an interpreter."4 However, as Justice Blackmun
observed, Zobrest did not involve simply the "disbursement of funds."''
Rather, this case marks the first time the Court permitted a publicly funded
employee to be directly involved in a student's ongoing religious indoctrination in a parochial school. 4 2
Prior to this case, as Justice Blackmun observed, the Supreme Court
had endeavored to eliminate "even 'the opportunity for the transmission of
135. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of the endorsement test, see
Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement
Test, 68 N.C. L. Ray. 590, 598-612 (1990).
136. 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
137. Id. at 598-602. Notably, however, the court found that a menorah displayed next to a
Christmas tree in front of a city-county building did not impermissibly endorse religion "given its
'particular physical setting.'" Id. at 621.
138. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
139. 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
140. As the Court pointed out, the school district readily conceded this fact. Zobrest, 113 S.
Ct. at 2469 n.ll. However, Witters could have been distinguished from Zobrest because Witters
involved aid to a student attending a Christian college, not a religious elementary or secondary
school. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 93, at 932-33 (observing that the Court has been "quite
generous in allowing states to give financial assistance directly to religious institutions when
schools are on the college or graduate level" but has forbidden similar aid to religiously affiliated
elementary or high schools).
141. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2467-69.
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sectarian views"' by a publicly funded employee in a religious school.1 43

Under this approach even inadvertent transmission of sectarian views would
have violated the Establishment Clause. 144 Yet, by allowing a
state-provided interpreter to relate the content of religion classes and worship services, the Zobrest Court seems to permit such public funding of
religious instruction. 4 5
One of the bases the Court gave for distinguishing the aid in Zobrest
from that struck down in previous cases 14 6 was that the task of a

sign-language interpreter is different from that of a teacher or guidance
counselor. 4 7 An interpreter does not add anything to the school's instruc-

tion, but simply "'transmit[s] everything that is said in exactly the same
way it was intended.' "1 48 Thus, an interpreter is acceptable because there is

no teaching or indoctrinating involved, but rather a neutral transmission of
information.' 49 If the school intends for the information transmitted by the
interpreter to indoctrinate, however, a distinction is difficult to find. 5 As

Justice Blackmun pointed out, "[a] state-employed sign-language interpreter would be required to communicate the material covered in religion
class ... and the daily Masses at which [the religious school] encourages
attendance."'' Thus, the publicly funded interpreter is actively participat-

ing in the child's religious indoctrination.'
In addition, based on the Court's reasoning that an interpreter is acceptable because she neutrally relates information, an interpreter's function
143. Id. at 2473 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244
(1977)).
144. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Bal, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("[Tihe [Establishment] Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith:); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71
(1975) (requiring the state to ensure that "[state] personnel do not advance the religious mission
of... church-related schools"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) ("The State must
be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.").
145. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. See, e.g., Meek, 421 U.S. at 355, 362-63; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397; see also supra notes
68-80, 104-11 and accompanying text.
147. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.
148. Id. at 2469 (quoting Joint Appendix at 73, Zobrest (No. 92-94)).
149. ld
150. Id. at 2472 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
152. But see Dixie S. Huefner & Steven F. Huefner, Publicly FinancedInterpreterServices
for ParochialSchool Students with IDEA-B Disabilities,21 J.L. & EDuc. 223, 236 (1992). These
commentators argue that the provision of interpreters
does not involve the government in actual inculcation any more than does provision of
buses, eyeglasses, Kurzweil reading machines for the blind, or other equipment that may
have the incidental effect of providing small-scale, personalized access to religious instruction. The relevant consideration is whether the publicly paid employees are responsible for the inculcation.
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is in effect no different from that of a tape recorder. In both Meek v. Pittenger,153 and Wolman v. Walter,1 54 however, the Court expressly held that
state aid in the form of recording equipment was impermissible because
there was no guarantee that the equipment would be used exclusively for
secular purposes. 155 The Meek Court also struck down the state's practice
of providing public employees for hearing therapy because of the risk that
the employees might impermissibly promote religion. 1 56 Nevertheless, 5in7
Zobrest, the Court permitted analogous aid in the form of an interpreter.'
Perhaps anticipating such objections, the Zobrest Court also held that
the interpreter is distinguishable from prior cases because the state is not
directly aiding the religious school, as in Meek and Ball, by relieving it "of
an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in educating its students."' 58 As a result, the Court ruled that the aid was more akin to that
approved in Mueller and Witters.15 9 Still, this distinction does not address
the argument that religious indoctrination is taking place by means of a
publicly funded employee, which could lead to contorted results.
Suppose, for example, that James Zobrest had a wonderful experience
at the Catholic school he was attending. His parents then relate his experience to friends who also have deaf children, and the friends then apply for
assistance under the IDEA program and enroll their children in the Catholic
school. The government would apparently be required to provide an interpreter at the school for each deaf student who qualified for aid under the
program. Assuming that the number of deaf students in the school increased significantly, however, it might be more efficient simply to provide
an interpreter for each classroom in which there is at least one deaf student.
This could lead-apparently without violation of the Establishment
153. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
154. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
155. See supra notes 71-74, 82-85 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. The provision of such auxiliary services
was allowed in Wolman, but only because the services were offered at sites away from the religious schools. See supra note 85.
157. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. Arguably, the decision in Zobrest is broader than necessary.
This case could be distinguished in the future because it deals with a person who is handicapped.
Although the opinion did not address the issue, the Court may have been concerned that not
providing an interpreter would impermissibly impair James Zobrest's right to choose a private
education because his education at the Catholic school would not have been possible without an
interpreter. See Piercev. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding a state law that
compelled students to attend public schools unconstitutional because it impermissibly interfered
with the liberty of parents to direct the upbrining and education of their children); see also
Huefner & Huefner, supra note 152, at 227 (arguing that, although parents are not entitled to
reimbursement for the private education they have selected under the IDEA, "the public school
must make special education and related services available to the private school student even
though the student attends a private schoor).
158. Zobrest, 113 S. CL at 2469.
159. Id. at 2466-68; see also supra notes 86-101 and 123-32 and accompanying text.
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Clause-to assignment of an interpreter solely to religion classes, or solely
to the chapel to interpret worship services. Such a result appears profoundly illogical if the Establishment Clause is meant to afford protection
against "active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."16
Further, if the enrollment of deaf students in the school did significantly increase, at some point the school conceivably would have an economic interest in retaining the students. Thus, providing interpreters could
be an expense the school would otherwise have assumed were it not for the
government program. Under the Court's reasoning in Zobrest, then, a distinction no longer exists between this aid and that struck down in Meek and
Ball." ' However, does that necessarily mean the Court would find the aid
unconstitutional? The interpreters would still be present in the Catholic
school as part of a broad, general program that neutrally provides aid to
parents who then individually choose where to send their children to school,
with no financial incentive for them to choose a religious school.16 2 The
Court's reasoning in Mueller does not make clear that the lack of such a
63
distinction would lead to a different result.'
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent "that government crosses the boundary [of constitutionality] when it furnishes the
medium for communication of a religious message."' But what if the aid
provided in this case had been a hearing aid rather than an interpreter?
Would a hearing aid present the same constitutional problems as an interpreter or a tape recorder? Certainly the functions of all three are similar,
but it is not clear under the dissent's reasoning that this "medium" would
necessarily be unconstitutional. The hearing aid would appear to alleviate
Justice Blackmun's concerns about the "ongoing, daily, and intimate governmental participation" in religious teaching.' 6 Government involvement
in the form of a hearing aid, like the provision of funds, would stop once the
school or government provided the hearing aid. 1 66 Yet, if the dissent found
the hearing aid did not present the same constitutional problems, would
disallowing interpreters for deaf students for whom a hearing aid is insufficient be equitable? Certainly such an outcome seems unfair to those with
1 67
the most severe problems.
160. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
161. See supra notes 68-80, 104-11 and accompanying text.
162. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-68.
163. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
164. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the cash payments approved in Witters
and Mueller from the function of a state-funded interpreter).
167. See generallyLines, supra note 118, at 12-23 (arguing that the Court's application of the
Establishment Clause results in inequitable treatment of disadvantaged children).
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In any event, a state-funded interpreter involved in the ongoing teaching of religious doctrine presents serious Establishment Clause problems.
As Justice Blackmun observed, such aid may impermissibly "place the imprimatur of governmental approval upon [a] favored religion, conveying a

message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to its tenets."' 168 Furthermore, the presence of a publicly funded interpreter in religious schools
could lead to problems of individual liberty if the religious school required
169
specific forms of dress or conduct for anyone upon their premises.
Perhaps a better solution, as in Witters,17 0 would be to limit state aid

to funds provided directly to individuals so that they could, in essence,
purchase their own aid. This approach would alleviate the ongoing nature
17
of government involvement that the dissent in Zobrest finds troublesome.
Arguably, like the distinction attempted in Wolman,172 this solution is mere
"form over substance."' 7 3 Still, given the precedent leading up to Zobrest

and the problems that may arise from the aid provided in it,174 this resolution would seem to be a less troublesome and more consistent determination
of where to draw the line between church and state when dealing with public aid to religious schools. 7 '
Finally, Zobrest may represent a new method of Establishment Clause
interpretation in regard to public aid to religious schools. The Court's application of the Lemon test has received widespread criticism virtually since
the test's inception.176 Commentators have criticized the test as vague,
168. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun pointed out,
[a] traditional Hindu school would be likely to instruct its students and staff to dress
modestly, avoiding any display of their bodies. And an orthodox Jewish yeshiva might
well forbid all but kosher food upon its premises. To require public employees to obey
such rules would impermissibly threaten individual liberty, but to fail to do so might
endanger religious autonomy.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
171. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
173. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
174. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
175. Certainly, this solution could have other drawbacks, such as the logistical problems associated with finding an interpreter.
176. Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,LiberalNeutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor,62 Nomnw DA~mE L. REv. 151, 163-64 (1987); see also
Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 637, 680 (1980) ("[A]pplication of the Court's three-prong test has generated ad
hoe judgments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis."); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the
Supreme Court, 24 Vn.. L. REv. 3, 18, 20 (1978). Professor Kurland argues that
the three-prong test has resulted in as much confusion and conflict under the establishment clause as the Court's decisions under the free exercise clause. . . . [The
three-prong test hardly elucidates the Court's judgments. Nor does it cover the plastic
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leading to inconsistent results, and "simply incorrect." 177 Indeed, members
of the Court have also expressed their dissatisfaction with test. 178 Most
recently, Justice Scalia attacked the Court's use of the Lemon test:

Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys
....Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently

sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart . . .and a sixth has joined an
17 9
opinion doing SO.
Yet the Court has expressly refused to overrule the test.'80
As evidenced in the Court's use of the endorsement test,' 8 however,
18 2
the Court has strived to refine its Establishment Clause interpretation.
Zobrest, then, may represent a new trend in regard to public aid to religious
schools under which the Court will look to the facts of prior cases rather
than applying the Lemon test anew.
The Court has established considerable precedent in the area of public
aid to religious schools. 8 3 As a result, neither the majority nor the dissent

in Zobrest had to apply the Lemon test in its opinion. Further, the only
indication of the endorsement test in the majority opinion appears to be the
Court's contention that the presence of the interpreter in the Catholic school
nature of the judgments in this area. Judicial discretion, rather than constitutional mandate, controls the results.
ld.
at 18, 20.
177. Beschle, supra note 176, at 163-64.
178. Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that "[the three-part test has simply not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to
realize." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Further, a majority of the Court seems to have approved a modification of Lemon, as seen in its use of the endorsement test. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
179. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434
U.S. 125, 134-35 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
180. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (refusing to reconsider Lemon).
181. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2658-61 (finding an Establishment Clause violation when
government activity coerces individuals to participate in a religious activity).
183. See supra notes 40-132 and accompanying text.
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could not "be attributed to state decisionmaking." 18 4 This treatment may
indicate that the Court will ignore its stated Establishment Clause test criteria in future cases dealing with public aid to religious schools. Such a
change in the Court's analysis, however, would appear to further confuse an
already confused area by making future decisions even more unpredictable.
Zobrest illustrates the Court's continuing trend of accommodating increasingly broad areas of public aid to religious schools. By allowing a
publicly funded interpreter to be involved in a parochial school student's
religious indoctrination, the Court has made an unprecedented move in this
area. In addition, as demonstrated in the lower court's contrary decision in
this case,' 85 the Supreme Court's disregard of the Lemon test arguably allowed the Court to reach this result. If the Court continues this approach of
looking to the facts of prior cases rather than applying the Lemon test, such
accommodationist results are likely to continue. However, deciding such
important Establishment Clause issues on a case by case basis will only add
more uncertainty to the law.
T.

JONATHAN ADAMS

184. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
185. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. But see Huefner & Huefner, supra note
152, at 235-39 (arguing that the Lemon test can accommodate interpreter services on parochial
school premises).

